Robert Albro, research associate professor at the Center for Latin American & Latino Studies at American University: “Bolivia has almost exhausted its foreign cash reserves, its currency is devaluing, inflation is rising, and fuel shortages are crippling economic activity, sparking strikes and roadblocks. Criminal enterprise appears to be expanding, along with the country’s role as a cocaine producer and transit hub. Neighbors are bracing for a wave of desperate Bolivian migrants fleeing growing turmoil. With the end of last decade’s extractive boom, the country’s economic miracle is unraveling. Promised development boons, such as lithium mining, have not materialized. As Bolivia’s outlook becomes grimmer, throughout 2024 a rivalry between sitting President Luis Arce and former President Evo Morales for control of the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) has become increasingly acrimonious while crises mount. Seeds of the current political stalemate were sown throughout the long Morales presidency, as he declined to cultivate and promote potential successors. His presidential run was only disrupted by the electoral coup of 2019. But Morales still maintains that he is a ‘historic’ figure and the only one to lead the country again. The rivalry has damaged the MAS, made governing Bolivia extremely difficult, and it has recently descended into surreal territory. Arce survived a June coup attempt, and Morales accused him of orchestrating a self-coup. Morales survived an October assassination attempt, and Arce accused him of staging it. This month, armed Morales supporters took military personnel loyal to the president hostage. Ordinary Bolivians are expressing deep political disillusionment, state institutions are being compromised in the process, and the future looks dark.”

Kathryn Ledebur, director of the Andean Information Network in Cochabamba, Bolivia: “Morales’ supporters lifted road blockades more than a week ago, after violent police interventions and grassroots requests. More than 100 protesters remain imprisoned without adequate legal defense. Police arrested prominent Indigenous leaders linked to Morales and plan to detain others. The economic crisis and chronic fuel shortages increasingly complicate daily life, leading to protests from consumers and transportation workers. Arce opened gasoline and diesel importation to private enterprise after more than a decade of significant subsidies and state control. Although the measure should increase availability, significantly higher prices will make the fuels inaccessible to citizens and worsen inflation. Arce’s divided, ineffectual cabinet with an empty treasury continues to improvise. It appears incapable of negotiation, dialogue or finding pragmatic solutions for widespread popular demands. Violent para-state groups which operated during the 2019 coup have reactivated and threaten human rights monitors, with no government response. The Constitutional Tribunal, which has illegally extended its own mandate, continues to impede long overdue judicial elections and appeases the government with repeated rulings that attempt to bar Morales’ presidential candidacy and remove him as MAS party leader, leading to further conflict. As polarization deepens, the right applauds Arce’s politically motivated crusade against Morales and his supporters. Without dialogue and significant concessions, a divided ruling party could facilitate a far-right win in 2025 or before, if these actors successfully lobby the Trump administration to back a power grab against the MAS government, as it did in 2019. In any case, it’s unclear whether Arce will be able to complete his term.”

Carlos Sánchez Berzaín, Bolivia’s former minister of presidency, government and defense: “It is important to put the current situation in Bolivia into context. It is a country in which none of the essential elements of democracy established in Article 3 of the Inter-American Democratic Charter exist: ‘respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; access to power and its exercise subject to the rule of law; the holding of periodic, free, fair elections based on universal and secret suffrage as an expression of the sovereignty of the people; the plural regime of political parties and organizations; and the separation and independence of public powers.’ Today in Bolivia there are more than 300 political prisoners, there is no rule of law, and the conflict is between the ‘dictator-in-chief,’ Morales, and the ‘dictator-in-office,’ Arce. The supposed economic success of Morales/Arce was only the harvest of what was sown by Bolivian democracy between 1985 and 2003, bolstered by high commodity prices. The rest was developmentalism, over-indebtedness and corruption, the result of which is the ongoing crisis. The best example is the reduction of the gas power status that Bolivia held in 2003 to the country’s current status as an importer. The country is moving from poverty to misery as a satellite dictatorship of Cuba and Venezuela. The only possible solution is a return to democracy, which means restoring the rule of law and having a judiciary that is not subordinate to the regime, in order to guarantee free and fair elections.”

Diego von Vacano, professor of political science at Texas A&M University and fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center: “The civil unrest in Bolivia isn’t the cause of the country’s economic woes—it is merely a symptom of its deep crisis. While it is true that the road blockades organized by Evo Morales’ followers have generated serious economic losses for average Bolivians, they are the result of the intransigence of the Arce government with regard to potential dialogue with Morales, the head of the MAS party. An intra-party dialogue would diminish the conflict and lead the way to national stability, but Arce has been adamant in not wanting to engage the former president. Arce’s government is arguably the most ineffective since the country’s return to democracy in 1982 because it has wasted a huge amount of political capital. Arce needlessly entered into a war with Morales and has done practically nothing to allay the economic crisis due to the decline of natural gas, the lack of dollars and now the dearth of fuel. There is practically no investor confidence as a result of this, especially in the dormant lithium sector. If Arce were to open dialogue, or if Senator Andrónico Rodríguez were given a more prominent role to mediate, tensions could be eased.”

The Latin America Advisor features Q&A from leaders in politics, economics, and finance every business day. It is available to members of the Dialogue’s Corporate Program and others by subscription.

The post What Do Ongoing Conflict & Protests Mean for Bolivia? appeared first on The Dialogue.

In Brazil, rising insecurity driven by violence and organized crime requires innovative responses that balance public safety with democratic values. The state of São Paulo has focused on community policing and crime prevention, fostering collaboration between law enforcement and local communities. In contrast, Rio de Janeiro has relied on militarized interventions in favelas and high-crime areas, with mixed results and notable human rights concerns. This policy brief evaluates these policies, highlighting successes and setbacks, and offers recommendations that emphasize rule of law, accountability, and transparency for effective and sustainable security strategies in Brazil.

The report, based on comprehensive research, interviews and diverse stakeholder input gathered from private workshops and independent research, advocates for a shift towards democratic security policies that prioritize rule of law and community engagement over militarized approaches. Key recommendations include:

• Strengthening ties between the police and security forces, and local communities to foster trust and cooperation.
• Enhancing collaboration among various security agencies to effectively combat organized crime.
• Addressing corruption within the justice system to restore public confidence and ensure accountability.
• Investing in education, employment, and community development to address the root causes of crime.
• Developing norms that support transparency and accountability within security forces.
• Articulating effective policies that transcend the ideological divide, combining punitive measures with social protection policies and expanded access to justice.
• Promoting regional coordination and cooperation to address insecurity and organized crime comprehensively.

DOWNLOAD THE POLICY BRIEF HERE:

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No Brasil, o aumento da insegurança, impulsionado pela violência e pelo crime organizado, exige respostas inovadoras que conciliem a segurança pública com valores democráticos. O estado de São Paulo tem dado ênfase ao policiamento comunitário e à prevenção do crime, incentivando a colaboração entre as forças de segurança e as comunidades locais. Em contraste, o Rio de Janeiro tem se apoiado em intervenções militarizadas em favelas e comunidades urbanas de alto índice de criminalidade, com resultados variados e preocupações importantes em relação aos direitos humanos. Este relatório avalia essas políticas, destacando sucessos e desafios, e oferece recomendações que reforçam a importância do Estado de direito, da responsabilidade pública e da transparência para estratégias de segurança eficazes e sustentáveis no Brasil.

O relatório, baseado em pesquisas detalhadas, entrevistas e contribuições de diversos atores coletadas em workshops privados e estudos independentes, defende uma mudança em direção a políticas de segurança democráticas que priorizem o Estado de direito e o envolvimento comunitário, em vez de abordagens militarizadas. As principais recomendações incluem:

• Fortalecer os laços entre as polícias e as comunidades locais para promover confiança e cooperação.
• Ampliar a colaboração entre diversas agências de segurança para combater o crime organizado de maneira eficaz.
• Combater a corrupção no sistema de justiça para restaurar a confiança pública e garantir a responsabilização.
• Investir em educação, emprego e desenvolvimento comunitário para abordar as causas profundas do crime.
• Desenvolver normas que reforcem a transparência e a responsabilização dentro das forças de segurança.
• Formular políticas eficazes que transcendam divisões ideológicas, combinando medidas punitivas com políticas de proteção social e maior acesso à justiça.
• Promover a coordenação e a cooperação regionais para enfrentar a insegurança e o crime organizado de maneira abrangente.

BAIXE O RELATÓRIO AQUI:

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Dorotea López Giral, director of the Institute of International Studies at the Universidad de Chile in Santiago: “The recent election of President Donald Trump and his approach to multilateral institutions create a new landscape for the upcoming G20 meeting. This summit represents a crucial platform for Latin America to reclaim its place in the global dialogue surrounding investment, cooperation and development, given its historical underrepresentation among middle-income nations. There is a growing advocacy from regional civil society for equitable and progressive policies on climate change, energy transition, the digital economy and the regulation of artificial intelligence. Brazil faces a significant responsibility: to ensure the summit’s success while bringing the region’s priorities to the forefront. President Lula stands out for the introduction of a wealth tax aimed at generating resources to effectively combat hunger. This initiative, supported by ECLAC, invites critical dialogue on the implementation and equitable distribution of the revenue collected. The Global Alliance Against Hunger and Poverty proposal seeks a coordinated international effort to address the structural challenges affecting millions in the region. For Argentina, which needs to attract investment to reactivate its economy under the leadership of President Javier Milei, the G20 could provide a vital platform to capture the attention of international investors. The confirmation of Mexican President Sheinbaum to attend the summit could reflect a renewed commitment from the country to engage actively in international affairs. However, her capacity to exert influence may be constrained by domestic challenges, especially following the election of a new U.S. president. The G20 presents a vital opportunity for Latin American countries to come together and advocate for increased recognition and collaboration on pressing issues relevant for the region. The ability of these nations to articulate their needs and propose effective solutions will be crucial in ensuring that their voices resonate on the global stage.”

Joshua Simon, associate professor of political science at Johns Hopkins University: “President Biden will travel to Brazil for the G20 summit not only as a lame duck, but as the human representation of a bygone era of international politics. The G20 is, likewise, a product of that bygone era. It is a fundamentally technocratic forum, where heads of state appear for photo opportunities while bureaucrats work furiously behind the scenes, dedicated to the proposition that the complex challenges that arise out of global economic interdependence can be solved, or at least ameliorated, if enough clever men and women put their minds to it. By electing Donald Trump to a second term as U.S. president, the American electorate has issued a decisive rejection of that proposition and of the era of international politics that it animated. In this, the United States joins counterparts throughout much of Western Europe, where incumbent after incumbent has been hoisted on petards of technocratic post-pandemic social spending, climate policy and compliance with international laws governing migration and refugees. The future of foreign policy in these regions is impossible to foresee, unpredictability being the confessed strategy of Trump and his ilk. But what of the G20’s president and host, Brazil, and of the other Latin American member states, Argentina and Mexico? Each has had its own brushes with populism, distinctly à-la-Trump in the case of Brazil’s Jair Bolsonaro and Argentina’s Javier Milei. However, Mexico’s Claudia Sheinbaum, a celebrated climate scientist and experienced administrator, demonstrates that populists need not repudiate expertise and cooperation to demand redress of calcified domestic and international hierarchies. And Brazil, under Lula, has chosen as its priorities for the upcoming summit the eradication of hunger, the transition to renewable energy and the reform of international institutions, like the U.N. Security Council, that have been frozen by veto-wielding permanent members. When Biden campaigned for president in 2020, he promised to serve as a ‘bridge’ to a new generation of leaders. He failed—spectacularly—and it seems unlikely that his country will help the world find a bridge to a new era of international politics. But there are signs of such leadership arising elsewhere, including Brazil and Mexico.”

Júlia Henriques Souza, political risk consultant for Control Risks in São Paulo: “Current conflicts are one of the key pressure points within the G20. Last year, the group failed in its final resolution to build a consensus on addressing the Russia-Ukraine war. The escalation in the Israel-Hamas conflict also touches on diplomatic sensitivities and strong demands from the global civil society. Both conflicts will be topics of interest during the summit, but high-level representatives will likely try to steer clear from the issues due to the difficulty of securing unanimity on the matter. Closing out its presidency, Brazil is bringing attention to three points: a potential international system governance reform, combating hunger and climate change. Brazilian Indigenous and environmental conservation groups demand concrete measures to protect the Amazon and the control of greenhouse gas emissions from the government, but President Lula will likely push issues on climate change in a less tangible way, more focused on principles, as a strategy to build consensus. Due to the anticipated impact of the second Donald Trump term on the country, Mexico will likely be a relevant actor in this year’s discussions at the G20. This is also the first participation of Mexico’s new president, Claudia Sheinbaum. The G20 will be her first opportunity to showcase a commitment to tackle climate change, poverty and illegal immigration. The first two topics will resonate with Mexicans, while the latter will be a focal point in U.S.-Mexico relations. Argentina will also participate in the event, though it is not fully aligned with its Latin American peers. President Javier Milei will likely not follow Brazil’s push for the taxation of large fortunes and environmental conservation. Milei is, however, highlighting other shared interests in communications with Brazil, as the country is Argentina’s main commercial partner.”

Amanda Mattingly, former U.S. diplomat and founder of ACM Global Intelligence: “In theory, diplomats and heads of state will attend the G20 economic summit to talk about social inclusion, global governance reform and the energy transition. But in reality, they will gather in Rio to talk about Trump. This is an overstatement, of course, but in the wake of the U.S. presidential election, these leaders will be looking for ways to engage on sustainability, poverty and multilateralism itself in the face of a second Trump term and the likely withdrawal of U.S. leadership on these issues. They remember the first Trump term, when he withdrew the United States from the Paris Agreement, threatened to leave NATO and was openly hostile to the United Nations. Trump’s antipathy for global world order via multilateral engagement is no secret. For Latin America, it will mean winners and losers. Argentina’s President Milei will likely emerge as an ascendant voice calling for further right-wing, conservative policies aligned with Trump ideology. While Mexico’s new president, Claudia Sheinbaum, will likely be looking for allies like Brazil’s President Lula to lend support for a left-wing ‘Sowing Life’ agenda to tackle poverty and defend national sovereignty. Lula is no loser in this scenario—it’s a big deal to host the G20, after all—but his efforts to lead on global climate policy will almost certainly come up against the hard truth of resurgent Trump denialism. But of all the winners and losers at the G20 next week, President Biden stands alone in the most unenviable position of trying to convince world and regional leaders that Trump is an aberration in American politics, when we all now know he is not.”

The Latin America Advisor features Q&A from leaders in politics, economics, and finance every business day. It is available to members of the Dialogue’s Corporate Program and others by subscription.

The post What Does Hosting the G20 Summit Mean for Brazil? appeared first on The Dialogue.

Sin embargo, lo anterior no es suficiente, pues la acción del sector privado se enmarca en un contexto social y político que no puede ignorar. Cuando existe inestabilidad institucional, corrupción generalizada, altos niveles de criminalidad y violencia, polarización y fragmentación del debate público, resulta difícil pensar en que va a prosperar y tener éxito la actividad empresarial, como si ella fuera una isla que puede prescindir de lo que la rodea.

Los países latinoamericanos atraviesan serias dificultades en estos aspectos que, lamentablemente, Chile también experimenta. El “caso Hermosilla”, que evidenció cómo las élites habrían influido en el sistema judicial para su beneficio, es una clara demostración de ello. No es casual que, de acuerdo con el índice del Estado de Derecho de la organización civil World Justice Project, Chile haya registrado un deterioro en dos indicadores clave. El país, desde 2015 pasó del puesto 23 al 28 en la medición de ausencia de corrupción, que evalúa la existencia de sobornos, influencia indebida por intereses públicos o privados, y la malversación de fondos públicos u otros recursos. Chile, además, pasó del puesto 32 al 41 en la medición de calidad de la justicia civil, que evalúa si estos sistemas judiciales son accesibles y asequibles, y si están libres de discriminación, corrupción e influencia indebida por funcionarios públicos.

[…]

LEA EL ARTÍCULO COMPLETO EN EL MERCURIO.

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COMENTARIOS DE CHAVEZ: 

“Es muy peligroso enfocar a la región solo a través del lente de la competencia entre China y Estados Unidos, porque ya hemos cometido ese error antes. Lo hicimos durante la Guerra Fría, cuando miramos a la región como un área de conflicto y competencia, y creo que eso condujo a muchos problemas. China es un tema, pero hay mucho más.”

“[En temas de energía] existe una gran oportunidad. América Latina tiene un papel enorme que desempeñar cuando se trata de energías renovables y el futuro del planeta.”

“México es un socio comercial prioritario de Estados Unidos. Es importante reconocer la importancia, el papel que desempeña en la economía estadounidense. El comercio de bienes y servicios de Estados Unidos con México superó los 850 mil millones de dólares. De hecho, México superó a China y se convirtió en el socio comercial más importante de Estados Unidos. Tenemos el T-MEC, que se renegoció durante la primera presidencia de Trump y está pendiente de renovación. Es algo que debemos observar con mucho cuidado.”

“[Con respecto a Venezuela] creo que cuando Estados Unidos piensa en sanciones, deberíamos ser muy cuidadosos y tener en cuenta tanto en los costos como en los beneficios.”

The post Chavez: “Estados Unidos debería seguir enfocándose en la cooperación económica, el desarrollo y las inversiones con los países de la región” appeared first on The Dialogue.

COMENTARIOS DE TARACIUK BRONER: 

“[El Estado mexicano] recibirá una sentencia condenatoria [por parte de la Corte IDH]. Lo que haría [la Corte IDH] es establecer que se violaron derechos humanos con la adopción de esas normas y obligaría al Estado mexicano a modificar la legislación en cumplimiento de los estándares internacionales, aunque la contracara de esto es que es un proceso que tardará varios años”.

“[A través de las reformas al sistema judicial] se corre el riesgo de que los jueces terminen teniendo incentivos para decidir, no conforme a Derecho, sino conforme a los incentivos que generan quienes financian la campaña electoral. [Esto] pone a México en una situación muy complicada con relación a los estándares internacionales y a tratados internacionales que firmó, ratificó y se obligó a cumplir”.

“Distintos foros y actores van a monitorear la situación en México y pueden expresar su preocupación y condenar esa reforma, y esto es tan importante como lo que ocurra en paralelo con el proceso en el sistema interamericano”.

The post Taraciuk Broner: “La elección por voto popular de jueces pone en jaque la independencia judicial” appeared first on The Dialogue.

Todo nuevo Gobierno presenta su plataforma de manera diferente. Para este nuevo mandato, Trump no ha identificado prioridades específicas sobre América Latina, por lo que es muy temprano determinar esos cambios. Para Biden las prioridades empezaron con Centroamérica (el Triángulo Norte), seguido de México y la migración, así como un poco abordar la situación de Nicaragua, Venezuela y Cuba. En el transcurso de su Presidencia, el péndulo cambió de posición algunas de esas prioridades —con Cuba hizo muy poco, con Nicaragua aplicó mínimo esfuerzo en implementar la Ley Renacer (pero hizo mucho con apoyar la oposición e integrar a los presos liberados), en Venezuela se involucró en resolver la liberación de los presos y promover una negociación hacia elecciones libres (lo cual no fue frutífero).

Bajo un Gobierno de Trump, el tema número uno es la migración, la cual es un tema de política exterior toda vez que los países de donde provienen estas nacionalidades son fundamentalmente países políticamente difíciles y están expulsando a su gente. También Estados Unidos ha aprendido a manejar la migración desde un enfoque bilateral y multilateral, por lo que queda pendiente determinar el futuro de la implementación de la declaración de Los Ángeles de parte de este nuevo Gobierno.

[…]

LEA EL ARTÍCULO COMPLETO EN CONFIDENCIAL.

The post ¿Cuál será la política exterior de Trump hacia América Latina y el Caribe? appeared first on The Dialogue.

COMENTARIOS DE TARACIUK BRONER: 

“La situación con respecto a la migración venezolana del primer gobierno de Trump ha cambiado en cuanto a los números. Yo creo que es una política miope y muy limitada tratar de resolver el aumento de la migración venezolana hacia Estados Unidos con una política de mano dura de deportación y de tratar de evitar que entren por la frontera, porque en la práctica hemos visto que eso no limita ni evita la migración […] Si a Trump le preocupa que existan más venezolanos saliendo de Venezuela, lo que tiene que hacer es priorizar políticas que cambien la situación a lo interno de Venezuela”

“Podemos esperar que las promesas de campaña [de Trump] de ir fuerte contra la migración, de deportaciones, de tarifas, van a ocurrir, pero a la Trump, esto quiere decir, en un nivel menor de lo anunciado”.

“La retórica anti china del gobierno de Estados Unidos y las tarifas van a chocar de frente con el aumento de la influencia china en materia económica y comercial en América Latina, en una región donde los gobiernos miran a quien le facilita resultados y China ha sido enormemente eficiente en esto”. 

[…]   

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John Feeley, former U.S. ambassador to Panama: “By now, Latin America and the rest of the world should have learned to take Donald Trump at his word. He rarely is deceptive, he is permanently transactional, and he usually telegraphs his punches. To that end, Trump 2.0 presages a new era of chaos and iconoclasm in the conduct of government-to-government relations. Big losers will include Mexico, which may see direct U.S. military incursions. Trump recently promised to apply 100 percent tariffs on our neighbor, regardless of the USMCA trade agreement. Likewise, other trade agreements, to include CAFTA-DR and the bilateral accords with Colombia, Chile and Panama, will predictably come under an ‘America First’ review. The region can expect unpredictable tariffs and cross-sectoral quid-pro-quo transactional proposals, blending migration, organized crime and trade concessions. Central Americans in particular, along with the ‘pet-eating’ Haitian and Venezuelan migrants, will be subject to MAGA base-baiting rhetoric about polluting America’s gene pool, while those countries struggle to accept massive deportations. El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele and Argentina’s Javier Milei will undoubtedly become the favored sons, likely garnering early prized invitations to the White House, perhaps with Elon Musk in tow. But in perhaps the cruelest twist, the biggest loser in the region will be the democratic Venezuelan opposition. Given Trump’s predilection for cutting deals with adversarial strongmen like Kim Jong Un, it is highly likely that, despite Edmundo González’s congratulatory tweet, Donald Trump will not reimpose oil sector sanctions on Maduro, but rather insist on some kind of performative exit controls from Venezuela, thus claiming he has solved the border crisis.”

Andrés Rozental, member of the Advisor board, president of Rozental & Asociados and former deputy foreign minister of Mexico: “Donald Trump’s election victory is bad news for most of Latin America, but especially for Mexico. Given Trump’s campaign emphasis on trade and immigration issues involving the region, as well as his apparent control of both houses of Congress and of the Supreme Court, the way is paved for him to implement many if not all of the threats he proffered during the last few months. Although experience has shown that Trump often uses rhetoric and intimidations as a negotiating tactic, rather than as policies to be implemented, this time around, his resounding win and knowing some of the individuals he is likely to name to his cabinet all portend a complicated and aggressive set of bilateral relationships between the United States and Latin America. Drugs, undocumented immigration flows, trade disputes, border security and a general disdain for many of the region’s governments will probably result in unhealthy interactions with most of the current left-leaning leaders in Latin America. If one believes in Trump’s threats to slap high tariffs on all imports into the United States from abroad and his promise to massively deport undocumented immigrants, together with measures to close the border with Mexico and resume building the wall that was never finished, Claudia Sheinbaum in particular will be faced with a hostile neighbor with whom she will have to deal for the next four years. She has neither the experience nor the bravado of her immediate predecessor, and that doesn’t bode well for Mexico-U.S. ties going forward.”

G. Philip Hughes, former director for Latin America at the National Security Council and senior vice president of the Council of American Ambassadors: “In his first term, Trump saw Latin America through the lenses of illegal immigration (with accompanying narcotics/fentanyl trafficking, crime and violence) and ‘unfair’ trade arrangements/competition ‘stealing’ American jobs. To this, he added a reversal of most of Obama’s liberalizations toward Cuba. And, for a time, Trump backed the ‘Guaidó gambit’ to delegitimize and leverage Venezuela’s Maduro out of power—but he seemed to lose interest when the effort proved to be difficult. Now, after four years of record illegal immigration across a wide-open U.S. southern border, we can expect more of the same—on steroids. Trump says that his first foreign leadership call will be to Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum—threatening to wreck Mexico’s economy with escalating tariffs if she doesn’t stop the flows of illegal migration across the border. And he will resume his border wall construction. How his promise of ‘massive deportations’ of illegal immigrants will fare—or be implemented—is anybody’s guess, but President Trump always strives to keep his promises. I imagine that the general tone of the rest of Trump’s policies toward Latin America will be, ‘Ask not what the USA can do for you, but what you can do for the USA—to stay in our good graces.’ Trump may, again, further tighten the screws on Cuba since that regime now can’t even keep the lights on. He might again back efforts to leverage the Maduro regime out of power in Venezuela—a perceived competitor to Trump’s oil production plans—over its theft of last July’s presidential elections. And he’s likely to court cordial relations with any like-minded and friendly Latin American leaders. Otherwise, major visionary, ambitious, beneficent or altruistic U.S. initiatives toward the region will be in short supply.”

Cecilia Farfán-Méndez, researcher at the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation at the University of California San Diego: “The outcome of the election will significantly affect security in the Western Hemisphere, including the U.S.-Mexico border. Contrary to narratives of a border invasion, the issue at stake for Latin America and the Caribbean is the homegrown gun violence that has traveled beyond the United States and has matured into an urgent regional crisis. Easy access to firearms has deeply transformed the leverage criminal groups have vis-à-vis the state. Measured in homicides, Latin America and the Caribbean is the most violent region in the world. Whereas the world’s average is 5.8 homicides per 100,000 people, the region has more than double the global average with 15 murders per 100,000. Notably, 67 percent of homicides are committed with a firearm. In the Caribbean, firearms are involved in almost 90 percent of homicides (nearly three times the worldwide figure). With a Trump administration, it is unlikely we’ll see this issue getting the attention and cooperation it deserves. To be sure, countries in the region are not blameless, but violence would not be the same without army-grade illicit firearms easily available for criminal actors in the region.”

Louis DeSipio, professor of political science and chair of Chicano/Latino studies at the University of California Irvine: “In his 2024 campaign, President Trump did not focus on many issues. Among the few that he did address regularly were two that will directly shape U.S. relations with Latin America. Most important among these was a commitment to deport significant numbers of immigrants residing in the United States. The specific numbers he discussed varied but grew to as many as 23 million in some of the rallies toward the end of the campaign. Many of these immigrants migrated from Latin America and the Caribbean. These numbers can be dismissed as campaign hyperbole, but they indicate a willingness on President Trump’s part to deport not only unauthorized immigrants, but also immigrants on temporary legal statuses, asylees and some legal permanent residents. The consequences of large-scale deportation, at whatever level, will not only be tragic for these migrants, but also for their countries and communities of origin that are ill-prepared to absorb return migrants. The power imbalance between the United States and the countries of origin limits their ability to block deportations. The United States will also lose the leverage that it has been building to establish third-party destinations to slow refugee migrations from Latin America to the United States. A second issue that President Trump routinely addressed in his campaign, tariffs, is one that, if implemented on the scale that he discussed, could work to the advantage some Latin American and Caribbean countries. New tariffs on China and other Asian countries could create incentives to shift manufacturing the Americas, areas that could maintain relatively lower tariffs under existing treaties.”

The Latin America Advisor features Q&A from leaders in politics, economics, and finance every business day. It is available to members of the Dialogue’s Corporate Program and others by subscription.

The post What Will Trump’s Return Mean for Latin America? appeared first on The Dialogue.